

Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behavior: Saying You Like, Saying You Believe, and Doing

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The first of these three papers was originally prepared while Ken Lloyd was on sabbatical in New Zealand (Lloyd, 1980). It was published in the journal then known as the *New Zealand Psychologist* (now the *New Zealand Journal of Psychology*). This journal is not widely known outside New Zealand, and hence the paper has not had the audience we believe it deserves. Over the years, a small group of people have come to know about it, and we still occasionally get a reprint request from outside New Zealand. The issues he raised triggered some long and involved debates among the students and staff of that time. Those of us in New Zealand who work in behavior analysis have continued to find this a very useful paper, because it introduces behavior analysts to data from social psychology on the relation between verbal behavior and nonverbal behavior. We also find it useful when talking to social psychologists who do not have a behavioral orientation, as a good introduction to some of the data and ideas from behavior analysis—particularly to the early say-do and do-say research.

In introducing the data of social psychology, the scope of Lloyd's (1980) paper was broader than most of the say-do and do-say literature then current in behavior analysis. The paper equates attitudes to saying or, simply, verbal behav-

ior, and helps make clear that the tendency to reject the study of attitudes, on the grounds that attitudes do not exist, is probably not the best way to proceed. It points out that there is a vast literature in social psychology on the variables that can alter such verbal behavior, and it suggests that behavior analysis and attitude measurement have not come into contact because of the different subject matters they cover. Attitude measurement covers socially potent issues for which concomitant measures of behavior are very difficult to obtain, whereas behavior analysis covers situations in which behavior is more easily measured, so verbal statements are viewed as irrelevant. Lloyd suggests that we study both the verbal and nonverbal behavior in situations in which both can be measured, and that we study the variables that affect the congruence between them.

Lloyd also touches briefly on several interesting ideas. For example, the self-control literature (e.g., Rachlin & Green, 1972) suggests that preferences, as expressed by the choice of an alternative, can change depending on the time between making a choice and the availability of an alternative. Lloyd argues that if this is the case, then verbal behavior about preferences might also change and that such changes can contribute to the degree of incongruence between saying and doing. As far we know, this idea has not been explored by either behavior analysts or social psychologists, yet it is particularly pertinent to problem behavior. In clinical and behavioral interventions, using saying to change doing is important and widespread (Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Melancon, 1989; Kohlenberg, Hayes, & Tsai, 1993), yet the assessment and discussion of problem behavior usually take place away from the problem environment.

We wish to thank the New Zealand Psychological Society Inc. for kind permission to reprint the paper by Ken Lloyd, which appeared in the Society's journal in 1980. The full reference is given in the reference list. Ken Lloyd's article appears in its original form, except for a few typographical errors that were corrected. We also would like to thank Geoff White for encouragement in getting this project started and Margaret Vaughan for supporting it and making very helpful comments. Requests for reprints can be directed to either author at the Department of Psychology, University of Waikato, Private Bag, Hamilton, New Zealand.

We believe that Ken Lloyd's paper is still a useful one, especially for students, and are thus pleased to have helped in its reprinting. We have included an addendum by Lloyd and two additional papers that also discuss the issues raised by Lloyd. As a group, these papers examine social psychological findings from a behavior-analytic perspective. They show how different, but related, areas of social psychology can be addressed by an experimental analysis of social behavior.

There are several themes running through all three papers. One of these has already been mentioned; namely, that the phenomena of social psychology can sometimes be reworded or reconstructed in behavioral terms so as to describe better the phenomena that occur. This can lead to new ways to overcome old dilemmas and new ways to research social phenomena.

Because verbal behavior is mediated by people (Skinner, 1957), it is an inherently social phenomenon. This theme appears through all three papers, with suggestions that we should expect social control to be apparent (a) between what we say and what we do (Lloyd, Street), (b) in the formation and reporting of attitudes (Street, Guerin), and (c) in the formation and reporting of beliefs (Guerin). Attitudes can be studied only in conjunction with verbal communities (cf. Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918).

A third common theme is that verbal behavior plays a large role in human behavior: Much of our behavior is either verbal (and therefore controlled by verbal communities) or nonverbal but still verbally governed (Guerin, 1992; Riegler & Baer, 1989; Vargas, 1988). In the three papers in this issue, some typical reinforcement patterns of verbal communities are uncovered. That is, verbal behavior is more likely to be reinforced if it (a) is general rather than specific, (b) is abstract rather than concrete, (c) corresponds to behavior, (d) is an intraverbal presented as a tact, and (e) is a belief presented as an attitude. Such reinforcement patterns seem to be common across a wide range of verbal communities, and

have been studied traditionally in the research domains of speech acts, rhetoric, and pragmatics, under names such as mitigation, equivocal communications, and hedging (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990; Billig, 1987; Fasold, 1990; Holmes, 1984; Levinson, 1983; Ng & Bradac, 1993; Searle, 1992).

Although recent work in behavior analysis has started to show some of the conditions that mediate accurate self-reporting (Bernstein, 1986; Bernstein & Michael, 1990; Critchfield & Perone, 1993; Hayes, 1986), one of the key problems for social psychology is that verbal behavior and nonverbal behavior often do not match. This problem forms a fourth theme in the papers presented in this issue: the correspondence between saying and doing (Lloyd), the congruity or consistency between attitudes and behavior (Street, Guerin), and the consistency between attitudes and beliefs (Guerin). All three authors point out that consistency among attitudes, beliefs, and behavior is contingent upon the functional consequences provided by a verbal community. The authors (and others; see Riegler & Baer, 1989) point out that two consistencies commonly reinforced by verbal communities are those between saying and doing (Lloyd, Street) and behaving in the same way on two separate occasions (Guerin).

Finally, all three authors point out how the theory behind attitude measurement has problems when given a behavioral interpretation. Because attitudes are a social act and not merely a "passive sampling of the enduring mental state of the person" (Street), an attitude question, rated on a scale from 1 to 7, does not tap a veridical source of inner knowledge; rather, it measures social control of behavior. Although this might suggest that such scales are worthless, a point made above suggests that attitude scales can still reveal something about verbal communities by comparing ratings done by people within a specific verbal community to ratings by people outside that community. Attitude measurement tells us something about social reinforcement

patterns (cf. Fraser & Gaskell, 1990; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918) but not about a person's own inner knowledge.

We hope that these papers will help to clarify how behavior analysts can tackle some of the problems of social psychology without trivializing them. We also hope the papers provoke discussion. As noted by Ken Lloyd, social psychologists have dealt with phenomena that are difficult to measure with direct observations of behavior; behavior analysts can either ignore these phenomena or look to see how social psychology has researched them and augment this with a behavioral approach. We believe that the latter strategy is the most useful in the long run.

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